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When in Doubt, Wear Red: Understanding 
Trademark Law’s Functionality Doctrine and Its 
Application to Single-Color Trademarks in the 
Fashion Industry* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Fashionistas will soon be able to snatch up a pair of solid red 
monochromatic shoes after the Second Circuit partially invalidated the 
Christian Louboutin trademark for a red-lacquered sole.  The Southern 
District of New York had ruled against Louboutin in an August 2011 
decision that denied Louboutin’s claims of trademark infringement and 
threatened the future of Louboutin’s exclusive signature soles.1  If that 
decision had stood on appeal, Christian Louboutin would have needed to 
seek other ways to make up for lost revenue if demand decreased for his 
shoes—worn by celebrities like Angelina Jolie and Madonna and 
currently sold at high-end stores, like Neiman Marcus and Saks Fifth 
Avenue2––because of new competition from lower-priced brands that 
would be permitted to paint the bottom of their heels red, thus causing 
consumer confusion in the marketplace at the point of sale.  Luckily, for 
the sake of high fashion, the Second Circuit declared the trademark still 
valid (with modification) and allowed for a single color to serve as a 
“legally protected trademark in the fashion industry.”3 
Following the recent decisions in Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves 
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 1.  Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am. Holding, Inc., 778 F. Supp. 2d 445 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, No. 11-3303-CV, 2012 WL 3832285 (2d Cir. Sept. 5, 
2012).  
 2.  CHRISTIAN LOUBOUTIN RED SOLE, Registration No. 3,361,597.  
 3. Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am. Holding, Inc., No. 11-3303-CV, 2012 
WL 3832285, at *1 (2d Cir. Sept. 5, 2012).   
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Saint Laurent America, Inc.,4 this Note asserts that courts need to place a 
higher value on a mark’s acquired secondary meaning and reach a 
consensus on a cohesive determination of whether an aesthetic color is 
“functional” under the aesthetic functionality doctrine, and thus 
ineligible to receive a trademark.5  A trademark has established a 
secondary meaning when “in the minds of the public, the primary 
significance of a product feature or term is to identify the source of the 
product rather than the product itself.”6  In the Southern District of New 
York’s opinion in Louboutin, it determined that Christian Louboutin’s 
red sole was functional and threatened competition in the fashion 
industry.7  The Second Circuit held that the sole had acquired limited 
secondary meaning as a distinctive symbol that identifies the Louboutin 
brand, but did not reach the question of whether the mark itself was 
functional.8 
Part II of this Note surveys the history of trademark protection in the 
United States under the Lanham Act, including the rights of a trademark 
owner, the application process, and the appeal process.  Part II then looks 
at the functionality doctrine, an affirmative defense under trademark law, 
which evaluates the features of a product to determine if it can be 
trademarked.  Courts have evaluated functionality using two different 
theories, the identification theory and the competition theory.9  Part II 
evaluates two key Supreme Court trademark and functionality doctrine 
cases, Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co.10 and TrafFix Devices, Inc. 
v. Marketing Displays, Inc.11  The Qualitex holding allowed trademark 
protection for a single-color mark, and the case established a three-step 
analysis for determining the validity of color trademark registrations.12  
                                                          
 4.  Louboutin, 778 F. Supp. 2d at 445.  
 5.  See To Red, or Not to Red, LEGAL BISNOW (Aug. 18, 2011), http://www.bisnow.com/dc-
legal/2011/08/18/the-newest-practice (“If the red sole is deemed functional rather than decorative, it 
can’t function as a trademark. . . .  So far, there is no cohesive test for whether an aesthetic feature is 
functional, so it’s possible the Supreme Court will eventually take this case to rule on the issue.”); 
see also Louboutin, 2012 WL 3832285, at *9 n.17 (“The doctrine of aesthetic functionality remains 
controversial in our sister circuits, which have applied the doctrine in varying ways (and some not at 
all).”). 
 6.  Inwood Labs. v. Ives Labs., 456 U.S. 844, 851 n.11 (1982) (emphasis added). 
 7.  Louboutin, 778 F. Supp. 2d at 457.  
 8.  Louboutin, 2012 WL 3832285, at *12, *15.   
 9.  Mitchell M. Wong, Note, The Aesthetic Functionality Doctrine and the Law of Trade-
Dress Protection, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1116, 1120 (1998). 
 10.  514 U.S. 159 (1995). 
 11.  532 U.S. 23 (2001). 
 12.  Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 166; see infra text accompanying notes 77–80.  
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In TrafFix, the Court adopted the minority view among the circuit courts 
of the functionality doctrine—setting aside the widely used competition 
theory—ultimately creating confusion about the proper application of the 
functionality doctrine.13 
Part III begins by analyzing Louboutin, in which the Southern 
District of New York refused to enforce Louboutin’s trademarked red-
lacquered sole based on the color depletion theory and the supposed 
functionality of the shoe featuring a red sole, which the Second Circuit 
later refuted and revised.14  This Note then addresses a proposed 
application of the functionality doctrine in the fashion industry, using the 
competition theory of aesthetic functionality, which would provide 
trademarks intellectual property protection against infringement currently 
unavailable in the fashion industry.15  This Note goes on to debunk the 
color depletion theory and clarify the competitive cost analysis portion of 
the functionality doctrine.16  The functionality doctrine protects brand-
identifying single-color trademarks, like Christian Louboutin’s red-
lacquered sole.  Finally, this Note explains how this added protection for 
trademarks aligns with public policy concerns for protecting the 
creativity and intellectual property of innovative designers, while 
following the original objectives of the Lanham Act to avoid consumer 
confusion.17 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. The Lanham Act18 
“The term ‘trademark’ includes any word, name, symbol, or device, 
or any combination thereof” used to identify and distinguish goods, 
“including a unique product, from those manufactured or sold by others 
and to indicate the source of the goods, even if that source is 
unknown.”19  The Lanham Act codified trademark law in the United 
States.20  The Act passed Congress in 1946, and has since been amended 
                                                          
 13.  See infra Part II.C.2.   
 14.  See infra Part III.A. 
 15.  See infra Part III.B. 
 16.  See infra Part III.B. 
 17.  See infra notes 22–23; Part III.C. 
 18.  15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1129 (2006). 
 19.  Id. § 1127.   
 20.  Id. § 1051. 
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to fit modern business principles.21  When the Act passed, proponents of 
the bill argued that by protecting trademarks the bill protected sellers and 
consumers from fraud and misrepresentation.22  The Act gives a seller or 
producer the exclusive right to register a trademark, thus preventing 
competitors from also using the trademark.23 
The United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) issues 
trademarks.24  The Lanham Act outlines the requirements for trademark 
registration, including verification by the trademark’s owner that she is 
the rightful owner of the mark.25  When applying for trademarks based 
on color, the application must contain a drawing of the mark in color and 
show how the color functions as a trademark for the product.26  After a 
trademark is registered, the certificate of recognition is prima facie 
evidence of the owner’s exclusive right to use the trademark in 
commerce and in connection with the goods specified on the certificate.27 
The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board reviews all trials and appeals 
related to trademarks.  The Board was created by a 1958 amendment to 
the Lanham Act, which replaced the previous two-step administrative 
process.28  The board conducts trials to resolve actions between parties in 
opposition to a trademark or regarding trademark cancellations, and 
serves as a review board for appeals of trademarks that the PTO refused 
to register.29  If parties are not satisfied with the outcome at the 
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, they may appeal their case to the 
                                                          
 21.  See 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 
§§ 5:4–5:11 (4th ed. 2011).   
 22.  Id. § 5:4, at 5-15; see also Melissa E. Roth, Something Old, Something New, Something 
Borrowed, Something Blue: A New Tradition in Nontraditional Trademark Registrations, 27 
CARDOZO L. REV. 457, 470 n.77 (2005) (“One is to protect the public so it may be confident that, in 
purchasing a product bearing a particular trademark which it favorably knows, it will get the product 
which it asks for and wants to get.  Secondly, where the owner of a trade-mark has spent energy, 
time, and money in presenting to the public the product, he is protected in his investment from its 
misappropriation by pirates and cheats.” (quoting S. REP. No. 79-1333 (1946), reprinted in 1978 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274, 1274)).   
 23.  Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 162 (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 1052, 1114(1) 
(1988 & Supp. 1993)). 
 24.  15 U.S.C. § 1057(a) (2006). 
 25.  Id. § 1051(a)(1)–(3).  
 26.  Roth, supra note 22, at 478.  
 27.  15 U.S.C. § 1057(b). 
 28.  1 MCCARTHY, supra note 21, § 5:6.  Before 1958, the process was to contest challenges for 
both patents and trademarks to the Examiner of Interferences, and then appeal to the Commissioner 
of Patents or the Assistant Commissioner for Trademarks.  Id.  Congress deemed this process too 
burdensome for the Examiner of Interferences because of the caseload and therefore created the 
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board.  Id. 
 29.  Id. 
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United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.30  Alternatively, 
parties may appeal to a federal district court for a de novo review of the 
case.31  Trademark owners can also seek relief for knowing infringement 
under the provisions of the Lanham Act in federal courts: 
 
Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant— 
 
(a) use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or 
colorable imitation of a registered mark in connection with the 
sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods 
or services on or in connection with which such use is likely to 
cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive; or 
 
(b) reproduce, counterfeit, copy, or colorably imitate a 
registered mark and apply such reproduction, counterfeit, 
copy, or colorable imitation to labels, signs, prints, packages, 
wrappers, receptacles or advertisements intended to be used in 
commerce upon or in connection with the sale, offering for 
sale, distribution, or advertising of goods or services on or in 
connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, 
or to cause mistake, or to deceive, 
 
shall be liable in a civil action by the registrant for the 
remedies hereinafter provided.32 
 
The language of the Lanham Act does not preclude granting 
trademark protection to a single color unless it is a functional mark.33  
For a court to step in and enforce a per se rule against granting single-
color trademarks in a particular industry would “unilaterally and 
impermissibly rewrit[e] portions of the Lanham Act.”34 
  
                                                          
 30.  15 U.S.C. § 1071(a)(1). 
 31.  3 MCCARTHY, supra note 21, § 21:10. 
 32.  15 U.S.C. § 1114(1).  See the remainder of § 1114 for details on specific types of 
infringement and remedies.  
 33.  Brief for Tiffany (NJ) LLC and Tiffany & Co. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 
16–17, Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am. Holding, Inc., No. 11-3303-CV, 2012 
WL 3832285 (2d Cir. Sept. 5, 2012), 2011 WL 5126167, at *11. 
 34.  Id. at 17, 2011 WL 5126167, at *11. 
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B. The Functionality Doctrine 
To prevent parties from using trademark law to “put a competitor at 
a significant disadvantage,”35 a product feature cannot be trademarked if 
it is “functional.”36  The functionality doctrine acts as an affirmative 
defense for parties accused of trademark infringement that claim the 
allegedly infringed feature as functional.37  In Inwood Laboratories v. 
Ives Laboratories, the Supreme Court defined a feature as functional if 
“it is essential to the use or purpose of the article or if it affects the cost 
or quality of the article.”38  Thus, courts evaluate functionality by looking 
at either utilitarian features, or more amorphously, the aesthetic nature of 
the trademark.  Traditionally, two theories arose under the aesthetic 
functionality doctrine, the identification theory and the competition 
theory.39  Application and interpretation of the functionality doctrine, 
however, became more convoluted after TrafFix in 2001.40 
The identification theory is the original functionality doctrine 
theory.41  Protection of trademarks is fairly limited under this theory.42  If 
a feature has any function besides identifying the manufacturer or 
sponsor of the product, it is deemed functional.43  Based on case law, 
courts have developed four interrelated tests to determine functionality 
under the identification theory: (1) indicia of source, (2) commercial 
success, (3) actual benefit, and (4) consumer motivation.44  The indicia-
of-source test evaluates if the feature is only used to identify the source 
or sponsor of the product, and, if so, it is nonfunctional and may be 
                                                          
 35.  Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 169 (1995). 
 36.  Inwood Labs. v. Ives Labs., 456 U.S. 844, 863 (1982) (White, J., concurring) 
(“Reproduction of a functional attribute is a legitimate competitive activity.”).  
 37.  Louboutin, 2012 WL 3832285, at *11.   
 38.  456 U.S. at 850 n.10.  This was not a holding of Inwood, but the Court’s language was still 
an important part of the development of the functionality doctrine in trademark law.  See Amy B. 
Cohen, Following the Direction of TrafFix: Trade Dress Law and Functionality Revisited, 50 IDEA 
593, 634–35 (2010).  The language, however, blurred the distinction between the competitive theory 
and old Restatement language, and if applied literally, “would render virtually all designs 
functional.”  Mark Alan Thurmon, The Rise and Fall of Trademark Law’s Functionality Doctrine, 
56 FLA. L. REV. 243, 284–85 & n.180 (2004).   
 39.  See generally Wong, supra note 9 (“[T]his Note suggests that the Court’s definition [of 
functionality] is difficult to apply because it contains two divergent conceptions . . . .”). 
 40.  TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23 (2001); see infra Part II.C.2. 
 41.  Wong, supra note 9, at 1132.  
 42.  Id. at 1133. 
 43.  Id. 
 44.  Id. 
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trademarked.45  Under the commercial success test, the court evaluates if 
the particular feature is “an important ingredient in the commercial 
success of the product,” and if “the interest in free competition permits 
its imitation.”46  If a feature has additional value or benefit other than to 
identify the source, such as a utilitarian feature, it is functional and 
cannot be trademarked.47  The consumer motivation test looks at features 
to see if they could persuade a customer to purchase the product for 
reasons other than the source of the product.48  Thus, if the product 
feature has actual benefits beyond source identification as determined 
under the four tests, it is a functional feature.49 
The competition theory denies trademark protection that would 
eliminate a competitive market for the product on which the trademarked 
feature appears.50  This theory provides a wider scope of features and 
products that may be trademarked.51  Six tests from the case law 
implement the competition theory: “(1) comparable alternatives, (2) 
essentiality to usage, (3) relation to usage, (4) ease of manufacture, (5) 
effective competition, and (6) de facto/de jure functionality.”52  Although 
it is not the original functionality doctrine theory, the competition theory 
prevailed until TrafFix, in which the Court held that the competitive need 
definition of the functionality doctrine was incomplete.53 
Even with an understanding of these different theories of aesthetic 
functionality, courts divide on the application of the aesthetic 
functionality doctrine to protect the features of the trademark owner and 
the competitiveness of the marketplace. 
 
[T]he problem focuses on ornamental features that have the 
potential to influence consumer behavior, but are neither 
essential nor helpful to the primary function of the product.  In 
brief, the features which fuel the aesthetic functionality debate 
are the very features that lie in the unsettled terrain between  
 
                                                          
 45.  Id. at 1134–35. 
 46.  Pagliero v. Wallace China Co., 198 F.2d 339, 343 (9th Cir. 1952).  
 47.  Wong, supra note 9, at 1136. 
 48.  Id. at 1138. 
 49.  Id. at 1141–42. 
 50.  Id. at 1141. 
 51.  Id. at 1143. 
 52.  Id. at 1144 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 53.  532 U.S. 23, 33 (2001).  See discussion of TrafFix infra Part II.C.2. 
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the “identification” and the “competition” theories of 
functionality. 
 
The identification theory holds that such ornamental features 
are functional because they possess some quantum of value 
beyond the identification of their source.  On the other hand, 
the competition theory maintains the opposite view––these 
features are not functional because they do not significantly 
endanger the competitiveness of their respective products’ 
markets.54 
 
These tests do not focus on what features may qualify for trademark 
protection; instead, they focus on what features may not be protected.55  
Ultimately, federal district courts appear uncertain or confused regarding 
the application of these two standards to determine if a product is 
functional.56  Currently, the Second Circuit denies trademark protection 
only where such protection “would significantly hinder competition by 
limiting the range of adequate alternative designs,”57 and reiterated this 
rule in its decision in Louboutin.58  Thus, the Second Circuit appears to 
apply the competition theory of the aesthetic functionality doctrine.59 
C. Key Trademark and Functionality Doctrine Supreme Court 
Decisions 
1. Qualitex 
Qualitex is the leading case on the use of color in trademarks 
because it extended protection for single-color trademarks with 
secondary meaning. 60  Qualitex held that trademark protection for a 
                                                          
 54.  Wong, supra note 9, at 1153.  
 55.  Id. at 1154. 
 56.  See Thurmon, supra note 38, at 245 (explaining that within one year of TrafFix, the lower 
federal courts divided on the issue of what general functionality standard should apply).  
 57.  Brief for Int’l Trademark Ass’n as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Christian 
Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am. Holding, Inc., No. 11-3303-CV, 2012 WL 3832285 (2d 
Cir. Sept. 5, 2012), 2011 WL 5833570, at *21 (quoting Wallace Int’l Silversmiths, Inc. v. Godinger 
Silver Art Co., 916 F.2d 76, 81 (2d Cir. 1990)).  
 58.  Louboutin, 2012 WL 3832285, at *10. 
 59.  See supra notes 50–53 and accompanying text.  
 60.  Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159 (1995). 
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single color is possible.61  Ten years before Qualitex, the Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit held in In re Owens-Corning Fiberglass 
Corp.62 that color could be trademarked, which “reverberated throughout 
the legal and business communities and was thought to represent a major 
change in the law.”63  There, Owens-Corning filed a trademark 
registration application for the color pink for fibrous glass residential 
insulation.64  The Federal Circuit held “that the color ‘pink’ has no 
utilitarian purpose, does not deprive competitors of any reasonable right 
or competitive need, and is not barred from registration on the basis of 
functionality.”65  The color pink simply “serve[d] the classical trademark 
function of indicating the origin of the goods.”66  Thus, Qualitex 
represented the Supreme Court’s alignment with the Owens-Corning 
holding in honoring protection for color trademarks.67  Qualitex also 
resolved the split in the circuits between courts that recognized colors as 
valid trademarks and those that did not extend this protection to colors.68 
Qualitex manufactured pads for dry cleaners to use in the dry-
cleaning process.69  Since the 1950s, Qualitex had used a “special shade” 
of green-gold for its pads and sought protection for the mark after its 
competitor, Jacobson Products, started selling similar green-gold pads in 
1989.70  Qualitex registered the distinctive color of its pads as a 
trademark in 1991 and sued Jacobson for trademark infringement and 
unfair competition.71  After the California district court ruled in favor of 
Qualitex’s trademark protection, Jacobson appealed and the Ninth 
Circuit set aside the judgment.72  The Ninth Circuit ruled that the 
Lanham Act did not permit the registration as a trademark of “color 
alone” because of the possibility of companies monopolizing colors.73 
The Supreme Court, however, held that single colors may meet the 
                                                          
 61.  Id. at 166. 
 62.  774 F.2d 1116 (Fed. Cir. 1985).  
 63.  Jeffrey M. Samuels & Linda B. Samuels, Color Trademarks: Shades of Confusion, 83 
TRADEMARK REP. 554, 555 (1993). 
 64.  Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1118. 
 65.  Id. at 1122. 
 66.  Id. at 1123. 
 67.  Sunila Sreepada, The New Black: Trademark Protection for Color Marks in the Fashion 
Industry, 19 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1131, 1140 (2009). 
 68.  See id. at 1140 n.49. 
 69.  Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 161 (1995). 
 70.  Id.  
 71.  Id. 
 72.  Id.  
 73.  Id. (citing Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods., Co., 13 F.3d 1297, 1300, 1302 (9th Cir.1994)). 
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requirements for use as a registered trademark and, in light of the district 
court’s findings of fact that Qualitex did meet the basic trademark 
requirements, Qualitex was entitled to trademark protection for the color 
of its dry-cleaning pads.74  “It is the source-distinguishing ability of a 
mark––not its ontological status as color, shape, fragrance, word or sign–
–that permits it to serve [the] basic purposes” of a trademark.75  The 
Court did not object to the use of color alone when it has attained a 
secondary meaning and identifies a particular source.76 
Jacobson argued that, because colors are in limited supply, if one of 
many competitors can trademark a color, they all will, depleting the 
supply of colors.77  This argument failed to persuade the Court like it had 
the Ninth Circuit.78  The Court brushed aside Jacobson’s color depletion 
argument, ruling that the functionality doctrine could protect the color 
spectrum from depletion, if such a concern arose, and there was a need 
for access to a certain color among competitors.79  After Qualitex, it 
appeared that the PTO was to apply a three-step analysis for color 
trademark registrations: (1) Is there a significant nontrademark function? 
(2) What is the effect on competition? and (3) Is there any secondary 
meaning of the color?80 
2. TrafFix 
TrafFix, although not pertinent to color trademarks specifically, is 
key to understanding how the Court applies the functionality doctrine, 
which is the first part of the Qualitex test.  Without clear application of 
the functionality doctrine, courts could continue to deprive brands of the 
protection they deserve.  In TrafFix, the Supreme Court adopted a view 
of the functionality doctrine that five other circuits had rejected 
following the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Vornado Air Circulation 
Systems v. Duracraft Corp.81  In Vornado, the Tenth Circuit imposed an 
additional limitation on the scope of trademark protection: 
 
                                                          
 74.  Id. at 174. 
 75.  Id. at 164. 
 76.  Id. at 163. 
 77.  Id. at 168. 
 78.  Id. 
 79.  Id. at 169. 
 80.  James L. Vana, Color Trademarks, 7 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 387, 394–95 (1999).  
 81.  58 F.3d 1498 (10th Cir. 1995); see Thurmon, supra note 38, at 317. 
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Where a product configuration is a significant inventive 
component of an invention covered by a utility patent, so that 
without it the invention cannot fairly be said to be the same 
invention, patent policy dictates that it enter into the public 
domain when the utility patents on the fans expire.  To ensure 
that result, it cannot receive trade dress protection under 
section 43(a) [of the Lanham Act].82 
 
Vornado marked the first time that a court adopted a per se rule 
prohibiting trademark protection for features that were part of a patent.83 
TrafFix involved the design of temporary road signs typically used 
during road construction.84  Marketing Displays had patented a flexible 
dual-spring design built to withstand large gusts of wind.85  Marketing 
Displays asserted that its design was successful and led to customer 
recognition of the product.86  After Marketing Displays’ design patents 
expired, TrafFix Devices, a competitor, sent the signs overseas to be 
“reverse-engineered,” i.e., copied.87  TrafFix also marketed its product 
under a similar name, “WindBuster,” whereas Marketing Displays’ 
original product was called “WindMaster.”88 
Marketing Displays sued TrafFix for trademark infringement based 
on the two products’ similar names, trade dress infringement for 
TrafFix’s design, and unfair competition.89  Trade dress law generally 
protects designs or features on a product or packaging, which may 
include size, shape, color or color combinations, textures, and graphics.90  
While the district court and the Sixth Circuit agreed that TrafFix had 
infringed Marketing Displays’ registered WindMaster trademark, the 
Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s trade dress decision on the 
origins of the sign’s design, stating that the lower court should have 
considered alternatives for the product’s design.91  Thus, while 
acknowledging the split in the lower courts, the Court unanimously 
                                                          
 82.  Vornado, 58 F.3d at 1500. 
 83.  Thurmon, supra note 38, at 316. 
 84.  532 U.S. 23, 25 (2001). 
 85.  Id. 
 86.  Id. 
 87.  Id. at 26. 
 88.  Id. 
 89.  Id. 
 90.  Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 764 n.1 (quoting John H. Harland Co. 
v. Clarke Checks, Inc., 711 F.2d 966, 980 (11th Cir. 1983)).  
 91.  TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 27. 
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focused on the trade dress question related to Marketing Displays’ 
expired patents.92 
The Court emphasized the fact that Marketing Displays had held 
utility patents on the dual-spring design of the signs, thus making the 
product feature seem utilitarian under the functionality doctrine.93  The 
Court refused to look at the alternative designs proposal that the Sixth 
Circuit had discussed, stating that if Marketing Displays’ design was 
effective, it was functional.94  Ultimately, the Court held that Marketing 
Displays could not receive trade dress protection for its signs because it 
“cannot gain the exclusive right to produce sign stands using the dual-
spring design by asserting that consumers associate it with the look of the 
invention itself.”95 
The Court declined to apply the competitive need functionality 
standard, applying instead the minority per se rule from Vornado for 
utilitarian features to determine functionality from Vornado.96  TrafFix 
eliminated the widely-used competition theory for functionality, 
declaring it “incorrect as a comprehensive definition,”97 and reverted to 
the Court’s pre-Qualitex standard from Inwood, namely that a feature is 
functional “when it is essential to the use or purpose of the device or 
when it affects the cost or quality of the device.”98  Following TrafFix, 
“the trademark bar and the lower federal courts probably let out a 
collective groan” because the Court had discarded the competition theory 
and reverted to the foggy Inwood standard for functionality.99 
3. Putting Together Qualitex and TrafFix 
Before TrafFix, Qualitex seemed to nudge courts toward the 
application of the competition theory—which is more brand-friendly—
and reconciled this theory with the Inwood standard, which was 
technically only dictum.100  Qualitex continued the practice among lower 
courts of denying protection on functionality grounds only if the 
                                                          
 92.  Id. at 25, 27–28. 
 93.  Id. at 29–30. 
 94.  Id. at 33–34; see also supra notes 50–53 and accompanying text (discussing the 
competition theory of aesthetic functionality and comparable alternatives test).  
 95.  Id. at 35.   
 96.  Thurmon, supra note 38, at 323–24. 
 97.  TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 33. 
 98.  Id. (citing Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 165 (1995)). 
 99.  Thurmon, supra note 38, at 325.  
 100.  Id. at 295 & n.241. 
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exclusive use of a feature put competitors at a significant 
disadvantage.101  But, TrafFix held that Qualitex’s language does not 
imply that a product feature’s competitive necessity is an element of 
functionality.102  The confusion of standards is apparent in the following 
convoluted synthesis of case law on the functionality doctrine from the 
Ninth Circuit: 
 
After Qualitex and TrafFix, the test for functionality proceeds 
in two steps.  In the first step, courts inquire whether the 
alleged “significant non-trademark function” satisfies the 
Inwood Laboratories definition of functionality––“essential to 
the use or purpose of the article [or] affects [its] cost or 
quality.” . . .  If this is the case, the inquiry is over––the 
feature is functional and not protected.  In the case of a claim 
of aesthetic functionality, an alternative test inquires whether 
protection of the feature as a trademark would impose a 
significant non-reputation-related competitive 
disadvantage.103 
 
In TrafFix, the Court distinguished its ideas by stating that Qualitex 
applies only to aesthetic functionality, such as color.104  This is where 
objections to TrafFix lie.  There, the Court rejected the competition 
theory as the sole rule for determining functionality and replaced it with 
the Inwood standard, which the Court equated with the competition 
theory six years before in Qualitex.105  As one scholar aptly put it: 
 
Never mind that the Qualitex Court made no distinction 
between aesthetic and utilitarian functionality.  Never mind 
that the Qualitex Court relied on the Restatement (Third) of 
Unfair Competition, which made no distinction between 
aesthetic and utilitarian functionality.  The TrafFix Court 
needed a distinction, and it found one.  The [TrafFix] Court 
                                                          
 101.  Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 165 (citing Inwood Labs. v. Ives Labs., 456 U.S. 844, 850 n.10 
(1982)). 
 102.  TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 32–33. 
 103.  Cal. Bd. Sports, Inc. v. Vans, Inc., No. 06CV2365 IEG (AJB), 2007 WL 3276289, *7 (S.D. 
Cal. Nov. 6, 2007) (first alteration in original) (quoting Au–Tomotive Gold, Inc. v. Volkswagen of 
Am., Inc., 457 F.3d 1062, 1072 (9th Cir. 2006)).  
 104.  TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 33. 
 105.  Thurmon, supra note 38, at 325. 
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held the competitive need standard was fine for aesthetic 
functionality cases, but in utilitarian functionality disputes, the 
Inwood standard should be used.106 
 
Since TrafFix, however, some courts have opted to apply the 
Qualitex standard, favoring the competition theory and preserving the 
distinction made in TrafFix.  The Sixth Circuit held that “[b]ecause the 
Supreme Court has never intimated that aesthetic functionality should be 
evaluated in a manner consistent with the identification theory and has 
repeatedly followed the competition theory’s approach in addressing the 
second form of functionality . . . we expressly adopt the competition 
theory of functionality.”107  Similarly, in another decision supporting the 
competition theory’s application under aesthetic functionality, the Ninth 
Circuit held that “design decisions . . . made for aesthetic reasons––and 
not, for example, because they were the only, the cheapest, or the most 
efficient way to design a pool hall––is evidence of nonfunctionality.”108  
Indeed, it appears that the Southern District of New York applied the 
earlier Inwood standards for functionality in Louboutin.109 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. The Outcome of Louboutin 
1. Christian Louboutin’s Trademark 
Christian Louboutin received a trademark for red-lacquered soles in 
2008.110  He had used the color continuously as a feature of his shoes 
since 1992.111  In Christian Louboutin’s application for a trademark, he 
stated that the red soles were a source-identifying mark with secondary 
meaning, rather than a utilitarian feature of the shoe.112  Christian 
                                                          
 106.  Id. at 325–26. 
 107.  Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. v. Am. Eagle Outfitters, Inc., 280 F.3d 619, 642 n.16 (6th 
Cir. 2002).  
 108.  Clicks Billiards, Inc. v. Sixshooters, Inc., 251 F.3d 1252, 1262 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 109.  Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am. Holding, Inc., 778 F. Supp. 2d 445 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, No. 11-3303-CV, 2012 WL 3832285 (2d Cir. Sept. 5, 
2012).  
 110.  Id. at 448. 
 111.  Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am. Holding, Inc., No. 11-3303-CV, 2012 
WL 3832285, at *2 (2d Cir. Sept. 5, 2012).   
 112.  See CHRISTIAN LOUBOUTIN RED SOLE, supra note 2, para. 3.  
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Louboutin’s trademarked red sole met all six elements used by the 
Second Circuit to evaluate secondary meaning: (1) advertising 
expenditures, (2) consumer studies linking the mark to the source, (3) 
unsolicited media coverage of the product, (4) sales success, (5) attempts 
to plagiarize the mark, and (6) length and exclusivity of the mark’s 
use.113  Louboutin attempted to deter any argument that the red soles are 
functional in the declaration attached to the trademark application: 
 
The shiny red color of the soles has no function other than to 
identify to the public that the shoes are mine. . . .  The red-
soled shoes were an immediate sensation, and clients 
specifically came in to my stores looking for my red-soled 
shoes.  The red sole quickly became my signature.  My 
footwear is instantly recognizable by the immaculately 
lacquered red soles; upon seeing the red sole of the shoe, 
because it is so well known, people know that the shoes are 
designed by me.114 
 
The trademark has been incredibly successful, generating demand 
and admiration across the fashion industry.  “[Christian Louboutin] 
departed from longstanding conventions and norms of his industry, 
transforming the staid black or beige bottom of a shoe into a red brand 
with worldwide recognition at the high end of women’s wear, a product 
visually so eccentric and striking that it is easily perceived and 
remembered.”115  While recognizing that the law applauds innovators and 
rewards trendsetters,116 the Southern District of New York in 
Louboutin’s case against Yves Saint Laurent (YSL) blamed Louboutin’s 
commercial success as the reason the trademark slipped by and received 
registration from the PTO.117 
  
                                                          
 113.  Reply Brief for Petitioners at 26–27, Louboutin, 2012 WL 3832285 (No. 11-3303-CV), 
2012 WL 120569, at *18–19 (citing Centaur Commc’ns, Ltd. v. A/S/M Commc’ns, Inc., 830 F.2d 
1217, 1222 (2d Cir. 1985)).   
 114.  CHRISTIAN LOUBOUTIN RED SOLE, supra note 2, para. 3. 
 115.  Louboutin, 778 F. Supp. 2d at 448. 
 116.  Id.  
 117.  See id. (“[T]he United States Patent and Trademark Office . . . , perhaps swayed in part by 
the widespread recognition the red sole had already attained, invested Louboutin’s brand with legal 
distinction in 2008 by approving registration of the mark.”). 
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2. The Alleged Infringement and the Southern District of New York’s 
Holding  
Christian Louboutin sued YSL on April 7, 2011, under the Lanham 
Act for trademark infringement and sought an injunction against further 
sales of YSL’s monochromatic red shoes with a red sole, nearly identical 
to the shade of Louboutin’s red lacquer.118  YSL included four different 
red styles as part of its spring 2011 cruisewear line.119  YSL claimed that 
its shoes were inspired by traditional Chinese lacquer and the 
monochromatic color trend.120  The district court noted that to succeed on 
its claim for trademark infringement, Louboutin must prove that his 
trademark merited protection and that YSL’s use of a similar mark would 
cause consumer confusion.121  The district court held that Louboutin’s 
claim to the color red was overly broad and inconsistent with the Lanham 
Act’s scheme of trademark registration.122  The court did not challenge 
the holding in Qualitex—and while it half-heartedly applied the rules 
from Qualitex, it ruled against Christian Louboutin largely under the 
theory of color depletion in the fashion industry.123 
The district court began its analysis in Louboutin with a “fanciful 
hypothetical,” proposing a legal battle between Monet and Picasso.124  In 
this hypothetical, Picasso sought an injunction barring the sale or display 
of Monet’s water lilies paintings because the color Monet used in the 
ponds was too similar to the shade Picasso used during his Blue 
Period.125  On its face, the example seems trite and unrealistic because 
the two artists’ styles are markedly different; nevertheless, the court used 
this hypothetical to draw a comparison to markedly similar fashion items 
produced by Louboutin and YSL: 
 
If as a principle this proposition holds as applied to high art, it 
should extend with equal force to high fashion. The law 
should not countenance restraints that would interfere with 
creativity and stifle competition by one designer, while 
                                                          
 118.  Louboutin, 2012 WL 3832285, at *3. 
 119.  Louboutin, 778 F. Supp. 2d at 449. 
 120.  Id. at 454. 
 121.  Id. at 450. 
 122.  Id. at 454. 
 123.  See id. at 451. 
 124.  Id. 
 125.  Id. 
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granting another a monopoly invested with the right to exclude 
use of an ornamental or functional medium necessary for 
freest and most productive artistic expression by all engaged 
in the same enterprise.126 
 
The district court failed to effectively explain how the creative 
connection between colors used in fashion and those used in art, which 
comparison justified invalidating protection of the color trademark, 
prevailed over the secondary meaning and source-identifying function 
reasoning, which had protected color trademarks in Qualitex and Owens-
Corning.127 
3.  The Second Circuit Saves Louboutin’s Trademark and Quashes 
Infringement Claims 
In the Second Circuit’s analysis of Louboutin’s red-sole mark, it 
evaluated the secondary meaning of the mark to determine whether it 
met the requisite “distinctiveness” to merit protection.128  It held that the 
mark did merit protection as it had acquired “limited secondary meaning 
as a distinctive symbol” identifying the Louboutin brand.129 However, 
the Second Circuit modified the trademark to allow competitors to have a 
red sole if it matched the red upper of the shoe.130  Thus, the Second 
Circuit upheld the district court’s decision that YSL’s monochromatic 
design did not infringe Louboutin’s trademark.131  The Second Circuit’s 
reasoning wholly reflected the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Qualitex 
that a color is “certainly capable of acquiring secondary meaning.”132 
The Second Circuit relied on the district court’s evidentiary record of 
Louboutin symbol’s success to evaluate the secondary meaning claim,133 
and reviewed the question of distinctiveness as a matter of law based on 
the undisputed facts and those found by the district court.134  The Second 
                                                          
 126.  Id. at 453. 
 127.  See supra Part II.C.1. 
 128.  Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am. Holding, Inc., No. 11-3303-CV, 2012 
WL 3832285, at *12 (2d Cir. Sept. 5, 2012). 
    129.    Id. 
 130.  Id.  
 131.  Id.  
 132.  Id. 
 133.  Id. at *13 (stating that the record contains “sufficient undisputed facts to resolve the 
question of distinctiveness”). 
 134.  Id. 
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Circuit’s decision properly evaluated the evidence of secondary meaning 
in line with the Supreme Court precedent in Qualitex, and it lacked the 
disdain for single-color trademarks in the fashion industry that resonated 
throughout the district court’s opinion.  Instead, the Second Circuit 
apparently appreciated the brand’s worldwide recognition and the 
deliberate efforts of Louboutin to tie the color red to his brand, to create 
instant recognition of the shoes’ source.135  However, the Second Circuit 
upheld the trademark’s validity only where the red sole contrasts to the 
upper of the shoe to preserve the distinguishing symbol.136 
B. Proposed Application of the Functionality Doctrine to Color in 
Fashion 
1. Current Intellectual Property Protection in the Fashion Industry 
The fashion industry relies on trademark law to protect fashion items 
because current United States copyright laws provide little or no 
protection for fashion designers.137  Proposed amendments to these laws 
that would buffer protections, such as the recently reintroduced and 
renamed Innovative Design Protection Act of 2012, have been ignored 
by Congress.138 
While fashion sometimes is called art,139 this term is usually used 
when designers seek copyright protection for designs or styles that they 
consider “original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of 
expression.”140  A designer’s two-dimensional sketch of an original 
                                                          
 135.  Id.  
 136.  Id. 
 137.  Kevin V. Tu, Counterfeit Fashion: The Interplay Between Copyright and Trademark Law 
in Original Fashion Designs and Designer Knockoffs, 18 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 419, 425 (2010) 
(noting that fashion designs receive little protection under copyright law because of the inherently 
utilitarian nature of clothing).   
 138.  Last year the Innovative Design Protection and Piracy Protection Act was introduced in 
mid-July 2011, referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary, and then to the Subcommittee on 
Intellectual Property, Competition, and the Internet in late August 2011.  See H.R. 2511, 112th 
Cong. (2011).  The law was presented before Congress at the exact time it was trying to solve the 
country’s debt crisis, so it was largely overlooked.  It was also introduced in 2010 but did not pass.  
See Innovative Design Protection and Piracy Prevention Act: Hearing on H.R. 2511 Before the 
Subcomm. on Intellectual Prop., Competition, and the Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
112th Cong. (2011) for discussion of the bill.   
 139.  See supra notes 123–27 and accompanying text (explaining that the judge in Louboutin 
compared the protection for colors in a Picasso painting to Louboutin’s trademark for red-lacquered 
soles).   
 140.  See Aya Eguchi, Curtailing Copyright Couture: The Merits of the Innovative Design 
Protection and Piracy Protection Act and a Licensing Scheme for the Fashion Industry, 97 
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couture creation is protected under copyright law, but the actual three-
dimensional garment is not because it is considered a utilitarian 
design.141  Most goods in the fashion industry are considered utilitarian, 
unless there is a separable artistic element, like a sculpture, carving, or 
pictorial representation that could be protected by a copyright.142  This 
separability criterion challenges courts to determine how an element can 
be “separate from its useful functions.”143 
The best argument for allowing trademark protection for colors is 
that a color mark only excludes competitors from using the mark in the 
same way as the mark’s owner.  If that color mark is inherently source 
identifying, the color trademark deserves protection.144  A case from the 
home decorating industry provides a useful comparison.  In L.D. Kichler 
Co. v. Davoil, Inc.,145 the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals considered 
the competitive need to use a particular color. 146  The court examined 
functionality—as did the court in Louboutin—of a color used on 
Kichler’s light fixtures.147  The Federal Circuit reversed the district 
court’s ruling that Kichler’s signature color was functional, holding 
instead that its light fixtures’ “Olde Brick” color would be considered 
functional only if other competitors needed to use the color under the 
competition theory.148  A competitor could demonstrate this need by 
showing that Kichler’s Olde Brick color is “one of a few colors that are 
uniquely superior for use in home decorating.”149  This home decorating 
case provides a stronger, more tangible analogy for protecting single-
color trademarks in the fashion industry than the Picasso and Monet 
hypothetical that the district court in Louboutin used to justify not 
                                                                                                                       
 
CORNELL L. REV. 131, 139 (2011) (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006)).  
 141.  Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox: Innovation and Intellectual 
Property in Fashion Design, 92 VA. L. REV. 1687, 1745–46 (2006).  
 142.  Id. at 1748 (quoting 37 C.F.R. § 202.10(c) (1959)).  
 143.  See Laura C. Marshall, Catwalk Copycats: Why Congress Should Adopt a Modified 
Version of the Design Piracy Prohibition Act, 14 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 305, 315–17.  
 144.  See Sreepada, supra note 67, at 1164–65 (arguing that upon a showing of secondary 
meaning, colors in the fashion industry should be afforded trademark protection).  
 145.  192 F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 146.  Id.; see Sreepada, supra note 67, at 1152 (noting in 2009 that, as courts had not yet 
specifically considered the competitive need for a particular color in the fashion industry, they 
should use the standards set forth in L.D. Kichler because of the similarities in the fashion and 
interior design industries).   
 147.  L.D. Kichler, 192 F.3d at 1351. 
 148.  Id. at 1353. 
 149.  Id.  
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protecting single-color trademarks, based on the doomsday color- 
depletion reasoning. 
2. Potential Area for Protection of Color Trademarks After Louboutin 
a. Application of the Competition Theory of Aesthetic Functionality 
The application of the functionality doctrine and competition theory–
–the standard prior to the confusion among the circuit courts from 
TrafFix––is appropriate in color trademark cases.150  Courts should look 
at the six tests used to evaluate the competition theory: “(1) comparable 
alternatives, (2) essentiality to usage, (3) relation to usage, (4) ease of 
manufacture, (5) effective competition, and (6) de facto/de jure 
functionality.”151  Courts should apply a blend of this standard, proposed 
in Qualitex, in the fashion industry to both protect the consumer from 
confusion and to protect the innovative designer’s ideas in a fast-moving 
marketplace. 
The Second Circuit has previously relied on the competition theory 
to determine the validity of registered trademarks and similar trade dress 
cases.152  “Thus, in order for a court to find a product design functional, it 
must first find that certain features of the design are essential to effective 
competition in a particular market.”153  In Louboutin, the Second Circuit 
noted that courts “must carefully weigh ‘the competitive benefits of 
protecting the source-identifying aspects’ of a mark against the 
‘competitive costs of precluding competitors from using the feature.’”154  
The Southern District of New York failed to adhere to the controlling 
case law precedent for aesthetic functionality in its circuit,155 which held 
that courts would deny trademark protection only where such protection 
                                                          
 150.  The Second Circuit did not appear to be “confused” by TrafFix, as discussed infra at Part 
II.C.3, and applied the aesthetic functionality doctrine from Qualitex with TrafFix’s application of 
the doctrine to recognize whether the trademark “would put competitors at a significant non-
reputation-related disadvantage.”  Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am. Holding, 
Inc., No. 11-3303-CV, 2012 WL 3832285, at *9 (2d Cir. Sept. 5, 2012) (quoting TrafFix Devices, 
Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 32–33 (2001)).  
 151.  Wong, supra note 9, at 1144 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 152.  See Brief for Int’l Trademark Ass’n, supra note 57, at 30–32, 2011 WL 5833570, at *21–
23 (citing cases decided in the Second Circuit under the aesthetic functionality doctrine). 
 153.  Landscape Forms, Inc. v. Columbia Cascade Co., 70 F.3d 251, 253 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 154.  Louboutin, 2012 WL 3832285, at *9 (quoting Fabrication Enters., Inc. v. Hygenic Corp., 
64 F.3d 53, 59 (2d Cir. 1995)).   
 155.  See Brief for Int’l Trademark Ass’n, supra note 57, at 32, 2011 WL 5833570, at *23.  
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“would significantly hinder competition by limiting the range of  
adequate alternative designs.”156 
b. The District Court’s Improper Reliance on the Color Depletion 
Theory 
In Louboutin, an adequate alternative design for YSL could have 
been simply a different shade of red that is not confusingly similar to the 
shade Christian Louboutin uses on his trademarked red sole.157  The 
district court’s reliance on the color depletion theory is extreme and not 
in line with the Court’s more realistic view of color trademarks from 
Qualitex.  If a color is nonutilitarian and has adopted a secondary 
meaning, it should be protected.  This is the theory used outside of the 
fashion industry in cases like Qualitex,158 Owens-Corning,159 and 
Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co. v. Beautone Specialties, Co., 160 
and now applied in Louboutin.161  The Supreme Court reinforced its 
position on the importance of secondary meaning and colors in Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros.162 
Generally, to determine whether a color trademark has a secondary 
meaning, courts may consider such evidence as customer surveys; 
exclusivity, length, and manner of use; amount and type of advertising; 
media coverage; and sales volume and market share.163  The Second 
Circuit considered many of these factors in its determination that 
Louboutin’s red sole had acquired secondary meaning.164  Further, in 
accordance with European law, the PTO should protect trademark 
registrations by requiring the use of a commercial color code, which 
                                                          
 156.  Forschner Grp. v. Arrow Trading Co., 124 F.3d 402, 409–10 (2d Cir. 1997) (quoting 
Wallace Int’l Silversmiths, Inc. v. Godinger Silver Art Co., 916 F.2d 76, 81 (2d Cir. 1990)); see 
supra notes 52–53 and accompanying text. 
 157.  Reply Brief for Petitioners, supra note 113, at 21, 2012 WL 120569, at *13 (noting that no 
evidence shows that YSL lacks adequate alternative designs).  
 158.  514 U.S. 159, 166 (1995). 
 159.  774 F.2d 1116, 1123 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
 160.  82 F. Supp. 2d 997, 1002–03 (D. Minn. 2000) (noting that substantial evidence existed that 
the canary yellow of 3M Post-It notes had gained a secondary meaning before the defendants began 
using the color). 
 161.  Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am. Holding, Inc., No. 11-3303-CV, 2012 
WL 3832285, at *12 (2d Cir. Sept. 5, 2012). 
 162.  529 U.S. 205, 211–12 (2000) (“Indeed, with respect to at least one category of mark-
colors—we have held that no mark can ever be inherently distinctive. . . .  We held that a color could 
be protected as a trademark, but only upon a showing of secondary meaning.”). 
 163.  Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 82 F. Supp. 2d at 1003.   
 164.  Louboutin, 2012 WL 3832285, at *13–14. 
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could thwart confusion between brands about what color is “theirs.”165  
Louboutin claims that designers of women’s high-fashion footwear are 
only restricted from using “Louboutin red,” which competitors could 
quickly identify and avoid by referring to a proposed commercial color 
code.166 
c. Understanding the Effects of Costs on the Functionality Defense 
While the district court in Louboutin placed too much significance 
on the color depletion theory, it also misapplied the Inwood standard by 
assuming that if there is a competitive cost to the trademark feature––the 
red-lacquered sole in this case––the feature is functional.167  The district 
court noted in Louboutin that the red soles affect the cost and quality of 
the shoe;168 but that stretches the Qualitex holding too far.  The cost 
considerations come into play when competitors would be at a non-
reputation-based disadvantage for not getting the same cost savings or 
advantages from a functional use of that particular color.169  “[A] design 
feature affecting the cost or quality of an article is one which permits the 
article to be manufactured at a lower cost . . . or one which constitutes an 
improvement in the operation of the goods.”170  Using the color red on 
shoes does not affect manufacturing costs or provide Christian 
Louboutin’s shoes with any utilitarian advantage over shoes with black 
soles.  Simply that Louboutin generates higher profits than other high-
fashion shoe companies because of the demand generated by its shoes 
does not by any means make the cost of a red-lacquered sole functional. 
The Second Circuit did not actually analyze whether Louboutin’s red 
sole is functional.  It declared that it would not enforce any per se rule of 
functionality for single-color trademarks that would deny protection to 
                                                          
 165.  Roth, supra note 22, at 480.  
 166.  Reply Brief for Petitioners, supra note 113, at 20–21, 2012 WL 120569, at *12–13. 
 167.  See supra note 98 and accompanying text (quoting Inwood’s rule for when a product 
feature is functional). 
 168.  Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am. Holding, Inc., 778 F. Supp. 2d 445, 
454 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, No. 11-3303-CV, 2012 WL 3832285 (2d Cir. Sept 
5, 2012). 
 169.  See Brunswick Corp. v. British Seagull Ltd., 35 F.3d 1527, 1531 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (finding 
the color black functional because of its color compatibility and because it gives engines a smaller 
appearance); Deere & Co. v. Farmhand, Inc., 721 F.2d 253, 253 (8th Cir. 1983) (per curiam) (finding 
“John Deere Green” functional because of consumers’ aesthetic preference). 
 170.  Stormy Cline Ltd. v. ProGroup, Inc., 809 F.2d 971, 975 (2d Cir. 1987) (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (emphasis added), abrogated by Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 
(1992). 
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“any deployment of a single color in an item of apparel.”171  The 
desirability and exclusivity of a Louboutin shoe does not allow for the 
conclusion that an appealing aesthetic feature, like a symbolic red sole 
that makes the product more desirable than its competitors, is 
functional.172  The Second Circuit laid out the trademark-infringement 
test to evaluate Louboutin’s original trademark infringement claim 
against YSL: (1) whether the mark “merits protection” and (2) whether 
the allegedly infringing use of the mark creates consumer confusion.173  
The issue of functionality is an affirmative defense considered only after 
the test is satisfied.174  Because the Second Circuit determined that the 
red sole merits protection, and that there was no trademark infringement 
issue, it did not reach the issue of functionality nor attempt to apply the 
aesthetic functionality test to the mark.175 
The district court’s logic regarding the functionality of a shoe would 
damage trademarks in the fashion industry.  For example, Tiffany & Co. 
has trademarks for the particular shade of blue it uses on its catalogs, gift 
bags, boxes, and jewelry.176  Tiffany filed an amicus curiae brief with the 
Second Circuit because of the potential impact of the “sweeping and 
unprecedented per se rule against granting trademark protection to any 
single color that is used on any ‘fashion item.’”177  Tiffany charges a 
premium for its products based on its craftsmanship, legacy, and 
reputation in the jewelry industry.178  Tiffany’s higher price for its 
products does not mean that the trademarks it possesses are strictly 
functional.  Tiffany is able to charge $25 more for a key necklace 
pendant featuring Tiffany Blue enamel compared to a competitor’s key 
pendant of the identical design because of the recognition and popularity 
of the brand’s signature color.179  It is unrealistic for courts to interfere 
                                                          
 171.  Louboutin, 2012 WL 3832285, at *10, *11. 
 172.  Id. at *10.  
 173.  Id. at *11.  
 174.  Id. 
 175.  Id. at *12. 
 176.  1 MCCARTHY, supra note 21, § 7:44.50 (citing examples of single-color registrations for 
widely known marks since 1995).  
 177.  Brief for Tiffany (NJ) LLC and Tiffany & Co., supra note 33, at 9, 2011 WL 5126167, at 
*3. 
 178.  See Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 472 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (noting that 
Tiffany’s has high standards for its jewelry’s quality and craftsmanship as well as the integrity of its 
trademark). 
 179.  See generally Nicole Giambarrese, The Look for Less: A Survey of Intellectual Property 
Protections in the Fashion Industry, 26 TOURO L. REV. 243, 272 (2010) (citing the popularity of the 
brand as the reason the company increased prices 20–32% on “Return to Tiffany” collection items 
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with the commercial success of a particular brand or trademark by 
asserting that because Tiffany––or other well-known brands like 
Christian Louboutin––generates higher profits as a result of the 
exclusivity and popularity of the trademark, its trademarks are 
functional. 
C. Public Policy Concerns for Single-Color Trademark Protection in 
Fashion 
1. Advocating for Innovation and Design 
The Southern District of New York’s Louboutin decision failed to 
recognize and protect the intellectual property rights of the designer.  
Courts and the PTO should continue to allow designers protection of 
their multi-million dollar ideas when those ideas identify their own 
products and do not hinder a competitor’s entry into the marketplace.  
“Color has the power to make a design stand out in the marketplace and 
to define a brand.”180  Awarding one participant in the designer shoe 
market a “monopoly” on the color red—only on the soles of the shoes––
does not impermissibly hinder competition among other participants.181  
While competitors have legitimate reasons to use color in their shoe 
designs, it is unlikely that a designer would paint green, purple, pink, 
yellow, or any other color of lacquer on just the soles of her shoes.  
Christian Louboutin’s decision to paint his shoes’ soles red was so 
innovative and fresh that allowing the trademark to stand does not lead to 
color depletion in the industry, because other designers do not want to be 
accused of simply copying a successful and iconic idea.  That source-
identifying mark, a red-lacquered sole, is already trademarked, and 
Christian Louboutin has used it for almost two decades.182  Although the 
Second Circuit modified the trademark to only allow protection when the 
red sole contrasts from the upper of the shoe, it also pointed out that this 
sharp contrast is “nearly always” present in Louboutin’s designs.183 
                                                                                                                       
 
from 2002 to 2004). 
 180.  Sreepada, supra note 67, at 1133.  
 181.  Contra Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am. Holding, Inc., 778 F. Supp. 2d 
445, 454 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, No. 11-3303-CV, 2012 WL 3832285 (2d Cir. 
Sept 5, 2012). 
 182.  See supra Part III.A.1.  
 183. Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am. Holding, Inc., No. 11-3303-CV, 2012 
WL 3832285, at *1 (2d Cir. Sept. 5, 2012).   
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In the fast-paced fashion industry, other designers strive to innovate 
their own multi-million dollar idea, instead of just copying.  “[T]he sales 
of the copy substitute for and hence reduce sales of the original. . . .  
Either way, the profits of the original designer can be much reduced.”184  
Mass copying of a single idea, such as lacquering the soles of shoes, may 
also affect the entire “direction of innovation.”185 
 
Designers unprotected against design copying see a 
disproportionate effect on their profitability, and hence are 
discouraged from innovating––indeed, from entering in the 
first place.  Designers who are protected by trademark and 
trade dress innovate in ways that play to these legal 
advantages.  The resulting effect on the direction of innovation 
is to favor innovation by designers who already enjoy existing 
protection by other aspects of intellectual property law, over 
innovation by designers . . . who are not thus protected.186 
2. Avoiding Consumer Confusion in the Marketplace 
Allowing other shoe designers to use red soles would have 
propagated confusion among consumers, frustrating one of the major 
objectives of the Lanham Act.187  In the case of Louboutin, the designer 
shoe market is small enough that all of the consumers who can afford 
shoes that cost at least $400 can readily identify a Christian Louboutin 
shoe.188  The Second Circuit, however, did not discuss consumer 
confusion in Louboutin, as the court established that there was no 
infringement so it did not need to evaluate any potential confusion.189  
The Second Circuit analyzes the likelihood of consumer confusion using 
criteria established by Judge Friendly’s 1961 decision in Polaroid Corp. 
v. Polarad Electronics Corp.190  The key factors from that decision are 
                                                          
 184.  C. Scott Hemphill & Jeannie Suk, The Law, Culture, and Economics of Fashion, 61 STAN. 
L. REV. 1147, 1175–76 (2009). 
 185.  Id. at 1175. 
 186.  Id. at 1176–77.  
 187.  See supra notes 22–23 (explaining the purposes behind the Lanham Act).  
 188.  Secondary meaning can be determined by looking at just a segment of consumers.  
Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am. Holding, Inc., No. 11-3303-CV, 2012 WL 
3832285, *13 n.23 (2d Cir. Sept 5, 2012).    
 189.  Id. at *12; see supra note 173 and accompanying text (discussing the trademark-
infringement test).   
 190.  287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1961). 
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(1) the strength of the mark, (2) the degree of similarity between the 
marks at issue, and (3) the competitive proximity of the products.191  
Louboutin’s trademark is strong enough to lead to consumer confusion 
both prior to the sale and post-sale,192 and while confusion must be 
proven to establish trademark protection, confusion in the marketplace 
significantly frustrates the fundamental policy interest of trademark 
law.193  Customer confusion is commonly associated with confusion that 
occurs at the point of sale, but it also includes post-sale confusion that 
can occur when the product is presented without labeling or trade dress 
features, such marketing, or, in the case of footwear, the name on the 
inside of the shoe.194  “[S]eeing a ‘flash of red’ walking by on the street 
would cause consumers’ ‘cognitive bulbs [to] instantly flash to associate 
[the red outsoles with] “Louboutin.”’”195  Finally, another harm that may 
arise without protection for Louboutin’s mark is “dilution by blurring,” 
which is an “association arising from the similarity between a mark or 
trade name and a famous mark that impairs the distinctiveness of the 
famous mark.”196 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Courts need to reach a consensus on a cohesive test to determine 
whether an aesthetic color is functional and thus ineligible to receive a 
trademark, while recognizing and valuing any secondary meanings of the 
mark.  Color depletion is just a theory, yet judges can, and have, applied 
it inappropriately to deny protection to colors used by designers in a 
signature, brand-identifying fashion––although the Second Circuit’s 
reversal of the district court’s holding will hopefully diminish the 
usefulness of the theory or its application to the fashion industry.  The 
Second Circuit applied the functionality doctrine from Qualitex, thus 
overruling a per se rule of functionality and preventing any discretionary 
application of functionality to single-color trademarks in the fashion 
industry.  Such an application of the doctrine protects source-identifying, 
                                                          
 191.  Reply Brief for Petitioners, supra note 113, at 30, 2012 WL 120569, at *22 (citing Mobil 
Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp., 818 F.2d 254, 258 (2d Cir. 1987)).  
 192.  Id. at 30–31, 2012 WL 120569, at *22–23.  
 193.  Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 799 F.2d 867, 875 (2d Cir. 1986).  
 194.  See, e.g., id. at 870 (finding that Levi jeans can be easily identified in the post-sale setting).  
 195.  Reply Brief for Petitioners, supra note 113, at 34, 2012 WL 120569, at *26 (second and 
third alterations in original). 
 196.  Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 111 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 
1125(c)(2)(b)(i)–(vi)).  
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nonfunctional trademarks like Christian Louboutin’s red-lacquered soles.  
This protection aligns with public policy concerns for promoting 
creativity and innovation, and follows the original objectives of the 
Lanham Act, namely to avoid misrepresentation and consumer 
confusion. 
 
